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ABSTRACT
Bluetooth is among the dominant standards for wireless short-range
communication with multi-billion Bluetooth devices shipped each
year. Basic Bluetooth analysis inside consumer hardware such as
smartphones can be accomplished observing the Host Controller
Interface (HCI) between the operating system’s driver and the Blue-
tooth chip. However, the HCI does not provide insights to tasks run-
ning inside a Bluetooth chip or Link Layer (LL) packets exchanged
over the air. As of today, consumer hardware internal behavior can
only be observed with external, and often expensive tools, that need
to be present during initial device pairing. In this paper, we leverage
standard smartphones for on-device Bluetooth analysis and reverse
engineer a diagnostic protocol that resides inside Broadcom chips.
Diagnostic features include sniffing lower layers such as LL for
Classic Bluetooth and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), transmission
and reception statistics, test mode, and memory peek and poke.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth is a widespread standard for short-range wireless com-
munication. Initially developed as infrared replacement and for
applications like wireless headphones in the ’90s, it is now spread-
ing with Internet of Things (IoT) devices [5]. Features still making
it interesting nowadays are BLE introduced in version 4.0, mesh
networking in 5.0 and localization in 5.1 [2–4].
A conventional Bluetooth diagnostic and sniffing setup requires
external components and might necessitate wireless network infras-
tructure changes. A sniffer follows the frequency hopping scheme
of a connection. Some devices only require basic connection estab-
lishment without pairing for encryption. To decrypt paired devices’
encryption, a sniffer must observe the initial Secure Simple Pair-
ing (SSP) procedure, and if numeric comparison is used actively
alter exchanged packets. Existing sniffing solutions range from pro-
fessional but expensive Ellisys equipment to numerous open source
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solutions, the latter having less stable implementations to follow
encryption and hopping, such as Ubertooth and Bluefruit [1, 8, 11].
None of these run on the analyzed off-the-shelf device itself.
Most likely users of such a setup are aware of sniffing.We assume
sniffers are installed to legally observe and analyze traffic between
devices the analyst owns. Typical use cases are to inspect security
of a proprietary smartphone app communicating with a proprietary
IoT device, or to analyze performance on the Physical Layer (PHY)
of a smartphone app and IoT firmware under development.
Android devices offer the BTSnoop Log, a developer option,
which only covers HCI containing messages exchanged between
the operating system and the Bluetooth chip. HCI is the Bluetooth
middleware layer, but lower layer packets are not directly encap-
sulated within HCI and hence cannot be observed this way. In
contrast, traces sniffed over the air with an external sniffer only
contain Classic Bluetooth Link Manager Protocol (LMP) and BLE
Link Control Protocol (LCP) packets. The toolchain implemented
in this paper captures both, HCI and LL traces, and can inject LMP
packets. To the best of our knowledge, Bluetooth LLs did not expe-
rience security research yet, and we are the first to uncover major
security issues within their implementations.
When reverse engineering symbols extracted from a Broadcom
IoT BLE/Basic Rate (BR) 5.0 evaluation kit firmware from 2018,
we found an undocumented diagnostic serial protocol. A small
subset of this diagnostic protocol is contained in Apple’s Bluetooth
Explorer and Packet Logger on some MacBooks [13], but only
allows some pre-configured usage for LL sniffing and is not further
documented. Diagnostic features also include memory reading and
writing as well as dumps inside the firmware, producing statistics
for throughput, and controlling device under test mode.
Broadcom is ranked market leader for wireless communication
chips, followed by Qualcomm and MediaTek [16]. The diagnostic
protocol that we reverse engineered is not disabled on consumer
devices and can be found throughout all smartphones with Broad-
com chips we analyzed, such as Nexus 5/6P and Samsung Galaxy
S6. Moreover it is supported by chips in Raspberry Pi 3/3+.
With this paper, we enable diagnostic mode on a variety of off-
the-shelf devices and program software to control and interpret
diagnostics. Our contributions are as follows:
• Implementation of live forwarding of diagnostic messages
to a Linux host which can remotely control and analyze
diagnostic mode including a live traffic view.
• Patching drivers of Android 6.0.1, Android 7.1.2 and Lin-
eageOS 14.1 to forward the diagnostic protocol.
• Enabling LMP injection.
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Figure 1: Architecture of the Bluetooth protocol stack including diagnostics setup.
• Showcase this is a powerful security analysis tool by discov-
ering two Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)
based on malicious LMP packets.
Source code for using Broadcom diagnostics with InternalBlue is
publicly available on https://github.com/seemoo-lab/internalblue.
It is the first zero cost sniffer for the Bluetooth LL.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
on the Bluetooth protocol stack and explains how to utilize it. In
Section 3, Broadcom’s diagnostic protocol features and inner work-
ings are reversed. We apply this knowledge on the Android device,
controllable and observable with Python scripts and Wireshark on
a Linux host connected over Android Debug Bridge (ADB), and
make first experiments in diagnostic mode including security flaw
detection in Section 4. We discuss the outcome and Broadcom’s
protocol design in Section 5. We conclude our findings in Section 6.
2 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 1 gives an overview of the Bluetooth protocol stack and hard-
ware components involved. The host system, in our case Android
or LineageOS, has a Bluetooth driver providing communication
services to applications. The controller, in our case a Broadcom
chip, manages connections and performs wireless communication.
A diagnostic trace including HCI and LMP packets can be found
in Figure 2. It is produced on Android by activating LL diagnostics
through our custom patched Bluetooth driver and interpreting the
output with our Wireshark dissector. Even though Bluetooth Media
Access Control (MAC) addresses have the standard 6 byte format,
only the lower 4 bytes are required to address devices [15]. This is
why diagnostic traces do not include the full MAC address.
2.1 Interface Between Operating System and
Bluetooth Chip
Host and controller are connected via HCI as defined in the Blue-
tooth standard [2, p. 656]. The host sends HCI commands to the con-
troller, while the controller indicates HCI events happening. Events
can be replies to commands, but they can also happen asynchronous.
In Figure 2, the host initiates a connection and the controller con-
firms this directly with an event. Later this will be answered with a
connect complete event, which can confirm successful connection
establishment but also indicate a page timeout. The host is not
aware of any LL actions performed between requesting connection
establishment and the feedback if this succeeded.
HCI is controllable via a serial interface using Universal Asyn-
chronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART). On Android systems it
appears as /dev/HS99 or a similar number. For testing purposes
the Android driver can be bypassed by directly writing to UART. A
useful HCI command to determine if the controller is running on a
Broadcom chip is reading local version information, which can be
sent on an Android shell as follows:
echo -ne '\x01\x01\x10\x00' >/dev/ttyHS99
The first byte is set to 0x01 to indicate in an H4 header that the
message will be an HCI command, as listed in Table 1. Following
content is a standard compliant read local version information
command. The controller answers with a command complete event
containing version information.
Figure 2: Connection establishment tracewithHCI and LMP
between two Nexus 5 smartphones.
H4 Type Command Direction
HCI Command 0x01 Host→ Controller
ACL Data 0x02 Host↔ Controller
SCO Data 0x03 Host↔ Controller
HCI Event 0x04 Host← Controller
Broadcom Diagnostics 0x07 Host↔ Controller
Message Queue Put 0x0a Host↔ Controller
WICED Studio (evaluation kit only) 0x19 Host↔ Controller
Table 1: H4 field bytes indicating UART traffic types.
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The Android driver offers more convenient ways to control this
serial interface. When compiled with the flag BT_NET_DEBUG=TRUE,
it locally opens Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 8872 for
sniffing and 8873 for injecting messages [9]. Traffic to these ports
can be forwarded over ADB to control them from a remote device.
Message contents are restricted to H4 types 0x01-0x04 without
Android source code changes.
2.2 Over-the-Air Communication Between
Bluetooth Devices
Bluetooth devices use a PHY which is frequency hopping on 79
channels. The Bluetooth master in a piconet controls the hopping
clock for all slaves. Communication can be encrypted based on
keys exchanged with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). Details
of lower layers are abstracted from the host and only handled
inside the controller. An overview of connection establishment
steps followed by diagrams of HCI and LMP packets exchanged
can be found in the Bluetooth specification [2, p. 1420].
Wireless Bluetooth sniffers aim to extract management protocols
exchanged over the air. On Classic Bluetooth this protocol is LMP,
while it is LCP for BLE. To successfully decrypt wireless message
contents, an over-the-air sniffer must be present during initial pair-
ing and succeed in following the hopping sequence. If the latter
fails, SSP must be manually repeated multiple times.
A sniffer implemented inside the Bluetooth controller is not
required to observe the initial pairing for demodulation and decryp-
tion. The controller knows all necessary connection information
and keeps internal states of not yet modulated, respectively demod-
ulated, LMP and LCP messages. This is the case for the setup in this
paper. Observing messages inside the Bluetooth controller comes
with the challenge to locate and extract this information.
3 REVERSING THE DIAGNOSTIC PROTOCOL
Broadcom enables testing their newest chipsets with evaluation
boards. The most recent available Bluetooth platform is CYW920735
Q60EVB-01, an IoT BLE/BR 5.0 evaluation kit 1, which is not only
meant to offer Bluetooth connectivity but also has sufficient mem-
ory to run an IoT application within the same chip. This applica-
tion can be programmed in WICED Studio [7]. When reversing
firmware of the evaluation kit we realized that the custom appli-
cation thread for the IoT platform is using the same thread setup
functions as existing threads within the Bluetooth firmware, sug-
gesting that there might be common bindings for several functions
inside the Bluetooth firmware within WICED Studio. In fact, a
file called patch.elf contains all symbols of the evaluation kit
Bluetooth chip’s firmware CYW20735B01. In addition the library
wiced_hidd_lib.a contains struct and parameter names, but cor-
rect mappings are harder to locate in this format.
3.1 Accessing the Link Layer
Being interested in lower layers, the function names diag_log
TxLmpPkt, diag_logRxLmpPkt and diag_logLcpPkt stand out. All
of these first check if diag_sendLmpPktFlag is set, and then copy
data to call the function tran_sendDiagDataToHost. However, the
1Cypress recently acquired some IoT branches of Broadcom, but despite the name
change firmware and features are similar.
opposite data flow must be found to enable logging. When check-
ing references to the flag enabling sending LL diagnostic logging
data to the host, the function diag_processCommand appears. The
diagnostic command 0xf0 followed by 0x01 enables logging, while
0xf0 followed by 0x00 disables logging.
Further analysis of diag_processCommand shows that enabling
LL logging is not the only diagnostic command. An overview of
all commands and answers generated is shown in Table 2. An
incomplete list of commands and their meanings is contained in
Apple’s Packet Logger, which is part of the additional tools for
Xcode. Not all MacBooks support LL logging with Xcode tools. In
our experiments it worked on a MacBook Pro from 2011, but could
not be enabled on a MacBook Pro from 2016.
3.2 Diagnostic Command Processing
The function actually receiving diagnostic commands turns out to
be btuarth4_HandleRXFullMsgDone, which does not only parse
H4 types 0x01-0x04, but accepts one documented message type
0x19 for WICED application debugging and the undocumented
diagnostic message type 0x07. Upon receiving a message starting
with 0x07, the function btuarth4_process_diag is called, which
then calls the function of interest, diag_processCommand. A fur-
ther undocumented H4 communication channel for putting mes-
sages into send queues is 0x0a, but we could only find it on Rasp-
berry Pi 3/3+. Table 1 also lists Broadcom proprietary H4 types.
Diagnostic Feature Command Direction
LMP Sent 0x00 Host← Controller
LMP Received 0x01 Host← Controller
Memory Access Response to Peek 0x03 Host← Controller
Memory Hex Dump Response 0x04 Host← Controller
Reported Completed Test 0x0a Host← Controller
Memory Access Response to Poke 0x11 Host← Controller
CPU Load Response 0x15 Host← Controller
Basic Rate ACL Stats Data 0x16 Host← Controller
EDR ACL Stats Data 0x17 Host← Controller
Received AUX Response 0x18 Host← Controller
SCO Stats Data (Type 0x1a) 0x1a Host← Controller
eSCO Stats Data (Type 0x1b) 0x1b Host← Controller
Get Connection Response 0x1f Host← Controller
LCP Sent 0x80 Host← Controller
LCP Received 0x81 Host← Controller
Reset Basic Rate ACL Stats 0xb9 Host→ Controller
Get Basic Rate ACL Stats 0xc1 Host→ Controller
Get EDR ACL Stats 0xc2 Host→ Controller
Get AUX Stats 0xc3 Host→ Controller
Get SCO Stats (Type 0x1a) 0xc5 Host→ Controller
Get eSCO Stats (Type 0x1b) 0xc6 Host→ Controller
Get Connection Stats 0xcf Host→ Controller
Toggle LMP Logging 0xf0 Host→ Controller
Memory Peek 0xf1 Host→ Controller
Memory Poke 0xf2 Host→ Controller
Memory Hex Dump 0xf3 Host→ Controller
Run Test 0xf6 Host→ Controller
Table 2: Complete list of diagnostic features and their com-
mand codes on CYW20735B01.
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(a) Live BR ACL
statistics while a connection to a headset is running.
(b) Recorded LCP trace within a connection to a
smart toy train equipped with BLE.
Figure 3: Wireshark Broadcom diagnostics example traces recorded on a Nexus 5.
Diagnostic Control Commands. The biggest challenge is that some
diagnostic commands and message contents are unknown and un-
named. The Wireshark dissector developed in Section 4.2 can be
optimized by programming a first version, recording traces, analyz-
ing missing fields, adding them to the dissector, and then recording
another round of traces. Debugging and reversing of further fields
takes a lot of time and some of their contents are still to be guessed,
such as the statistic types 0x1a and 0x1b in Table 2. Nonetheless, we
support decoding most of the outputs including BR and Enhanced
Data Rate (EDR) statistics with an example given in Figure 3a. Statis-
tics summarize packets transmitted and received along with errors
occurred—now observable even without continuous monitoring.
Memory Access. Diagnostic memory access is similar to what is
provided over HCI. Documented HCI commands are Read_RAM
and Write_RAM [6], which can modify memory of the ARM core
inside the chip. An undocumented HCI command that can modify
the Bluetooth modem BlueRF memory is SuperDuperPeekPoke
(0xfc0c). The Bluetooth modem is a separate component on the
chip, which is responsible for modulation.
Diagnostic memory peek (0xf1) and memory poke (0xf2) allow
reading and writing single memory bytes. The first memory peek
and poke argument is the access type, which can be ARM memory
(0x02) or BlueRF modem memory (0x03). The second argument
is a 4 byte reverse byte order address. For memory poke, this is
followed with the 1 byte value written to this address. Memory hex
dump (0xf3) needs always to be passed access type ARM memory
(0x04) and a 4 byte address. It returns 32 bytes memory content
starting from the address passed.
Diagnostic memory access has fewer message overhead and
parsing steps and therefore suits better than HCI for observing
variable contents while debugging firmware behavior.
Test Mode. The test command (0xf6) configures a test with similar
parameters as LMP_test_control over the air. More interesting is
the possibility to get a summary of a test status. The test status is
received within the diagnostic test response (0x0a) and includes
the number of transmitted and received test packets. To get this
basic test information no external test equipment is required.
3.3 Compatibility
After searching for similar H4 message type switch cases in other
Broadcom Bluetooth firmware versions it turns out that btuarth4_
HandleRX is implemented throughout multiple firmwares, such as
BCM2070B0 (MacBook Pro 15” early 2011, Lenovo Thinkpad T420),
BCM4335C0 (Nexus 5, Xperia Z3 Compact, Samsung Galaxy Note
3), BCM43430A1 (Raspberry Pi 3), BCM4345C0 (Raspberry Pi 3+),
BCM4358A3 (Nexus 6P, Samsung Galaxy S6, Samsung Galaxy S6
edge), and CYW20735B01 (IoT BLE/BR 5.0 evaluation kit). Their
build dates range from 2008 to 2018. We do not have a complete
set of Broadcom and Cypress Bluetooth firmwares but assume this
feature is present on all of their chips.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
Reversing diagnostic commands is only the first step in using them
on off-the-shelf devices. Further required steps are patching the
operating system’s driver to forward and process diagnostic mes-
sages, as explained in Section 4.1, displaying them human readable
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in a Wireshark dissector, described in Section 4.2, using them in ac-
tive Bluetooth connections to do first tests (Section 4.3), and based
on intermediate results improve the Wireshark dissector. Finally,
we uncover security issues within LMP parsing inside Broadcom
firmware we detected on various chips in Section 4.4.
4.1 Patching Bluetooth on Android
On Android 6.0.1, Android 7.2.1 and LineageOS 14.1, the Bluetooth
stack is implemented similarly. The biggest design problem is that
H4 types from Table 1 as well as their directions and lengths are
hardcoded in multiple places. This makes the required changes
44 lines of code in Android 6.0.1, and 41 lines of code in Android
7.2.1 and LineageOS 14.1. Again, the driver needs to be compiled
with the flag BT_NET_DEBUG=TRUE to enable injection and sniffing
as described in Section 2. A properly compiled Bluetooth driver
results in a file bluetooth.default.so, which can be copied to
the according system folder as privileged user.
Android 8 introduced major changes to the Bluetooth driver.
The basic driver is still using similar code. In addition, interfaces
are introduced—for components that should not be changed, since
changes are Application Binary Interface (ABI) breaking and might
stop other programs from working properly. The code of the new
interfaces IBluetoothHci and IBluetoothHciCallbacks defines
functions and callbacks for H4 types 0x01-0x04 [10]. This means
introducing new H4 types to Android 8 is an ABI breaking change,
so we decided to currently not support it.
4.2 Wireshark Dissector
Programming a Wireshark dissector for the Broadcom diagnostic
protocol creates some challenges. To ensure a good performance
along with portability, we implement the dissector as a plugin in C.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the actual challenge in writing a
dissector is to reverse engineer undocumented fields. We were able
to reverse engineer almost all fields of the diagnostic protocol, the
only missing part being the meanings of Synchronous Connection-
Orientated (SCO) and auxiliary (AUX) statistics.
Luckily the LLs, LMP for Classic Bluetooth and LCP for BLE, are
described in the Bluetooth specification [2, p. 508, p. 2589].
For LMP, a C-based dissector that can be integrated already ex-
ists [17]. Unfortunately the Broadcom diagnostic protocol deviates
from specification: it always reports the maximum length of 17
bytes for received packets. This needs to be fixed before passing
these packets to the existing LMP dissector. Moreover, Broadcom
implements an undefined LMP packet type 0x00 which is used for
Broadcom Proprietary Control Signaling (BPCS), as listed in Table 3.
This feature is only used within Broadcom Bluetooth connections,
we were able to observe it during a Nexus 5 and Samsung Galaxy
S8 pairing. A sample LMP trace was already explained for Figure 2.
Dissectors can also be found for LCP, but they are either not
C-based or not accepting the same header format, so we decided to
implement a dissector from scratch. Broadcom again added their
own features, this time using LCP type 0xff with meanings listed
in Table 4. A trace for a BLE enabled child toy train that can make
sounds and change driving speed with an app is shown in Fig-
ure 3b. Overall, LCP is more simplistic than LMP and requires
fewer messages exchanged to establish and manage connections.
Traces include the full MAC address of the connected device.
4.3 Performance
While enabling diagnostic logging or making statistic and memory
requests we did not recognize any performance issues or packet loss
while a connected headset was playing music. Upon initialization of
the UART interface, the operating system updates the baud rate to
3Mbit/s. This result is not surprising as the maximum throughput
of EDR is also 3Mbit/s.
4.4 LMP Injection and Security Analysis
Broadcom not only implements an undocumented diagnostic H4
interface. The standard compliant way of allowing modifications
are vendor specific HCI commands—we were able to reconstruct
259 command names and some of their parameters. In the context of
LL, SendLmpPdu (0xfc58) is the most interesting—it turns our diag-
nostic sniffer into an LMP injector. LMP packets are still validated
against standard compliant opcodes and lengths when sent with
this function, but except from this limitation any active connection
handle can be selected as receiver. While testing this feature we
already discovered two major security issues, CVE-2018-19860 and
CVE-2019-6994, and reported these to Broadcom.
Security Issues within Broadcom Firmware. The first security issue
CVE-2018-19860 is related to boundary checking of LMP opcodes.
Handler tables define which function to execute upon receiving
a packet with a certain opcode. When implementing the vendor
specific BPCS packet type, Broadcom forgot to apply an opcode
range check. Any opcode larger than 0x05, the maximum defined
in Table 3, potentially executes a function. Compilers tend to put
multiple handler tables after each other. On Nexus 5 (BCM4335C0),
the LMPBPCS handler table is followed byHCI handler tables.With
this vulnerability, an attacker can issue HCI commands over the air,
which should only be possible as privileged user on the host. For
example the LMP BPCS opcode 0x95 is mapped to the command
HCI_enable_device_under_test_mode. Executing test mode can
be used make the target device jam selected frequencies and drains
battery. Depending on the firmware version memory contents differ,
but limited code execution is probably possible on most chips. If
LMP BPCS Type Purpose
0x00 Features Request
0x01 Features Response
0x02 Not Accept
0x03 BFC Suspend
0x04 BFC Resume Request/Response
0x05 BPCS Accept
0x95 Enable Device Under Test Mode (Vulnerability)
Table 3: LMP vendor specific BPCS packet types.
LCP Extended Type Purpose
0x01 Vendor Specific Feature Request
0x02 Vendor Specific Feature Response
0x03 Vendor Specific Enable BCS Timeline
0x04 Random Address Change
Table 4: LCP vendor specific packet types.
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invalid addresses are executed, the Bluetooth of the device under
attack simply crashes. Vulnerable devices include MacBook Pro
2016 and Raspberry Pi 3. Even the iPhone 6 was vulnerable to this
issue until it was fixed in iOS 12.1.3.
The second vulnerability CVE-2019-6994 happens on out of order
execution of LMP commands. An attacker initiates SSP but does not
wait for user confirmation or cancellation of the pairing procedure.
Instead he directly sends an LMP_start_encryption_req, which
causes the Bluetooth firmware of the device under attack to crash.
The crash happens within the bignum_xormod calculation. This
issue only is present on very old chips such as Nexus 5 (BCM4335C0).
To exploit any of the vulnerabilities above, Bluetooth must be
turned on. The attack can be performed by anyone connecting to
the device, previous pairing is not required. An attacker only needs
to know the MAC address, the device can be invisible.
Commercial Bluetooth Stack Issues. Discovery of the LMP issues
inspired us to implement an MAC address based firewall that only
allows connections from previously paired devices such as the
user’s headset. Any LMP request originating from an untrusted
MAC address is answered with LMP_not_accepted. This patch
performs well on the protected device.
When testing this filter in the wild we found that on iOS devices
Bluetooth restarts exactly one minute after trying to establish a
connection to a firewalled device. The cause for this is bluetoothd,
the Bluetooth host implementation on iOS, which decides to restart
upon unexpected behavior—in this case a timeout from the HCI
create connection command, which does not return an HCI event
as expected. Restarting Bluetooth is not necessary in this context
and terminates currently established connections. Most likely Ap-
ple implemented this as a workaround for instabilities inside the
Bluetooth firmware. We reported this bug to Apple in December
2018 but did not get any feedback yet.
5 DISCUSSION
Integrating diagnostic features into a Bluetooth chip is something
probably all Bluetooth chip manufacturers require in their develop-
ment process. Leaving these in production level firmware builds
in combination with obscuring them by not documenting the cor-
responding interfaces can be considered a bad practice and only
provides security by obscurity.
Our previous work already enables LMP monitoring and injec-
tion on the BCM4335C0 chip in Nexus 5 [14]. We used assembly
firmware patches and recompiled Android drivers, with the for-
mer making it hard to port to other devices. It did not include LCP
logging and the other diagnostic features listed in Table 2.
Security issues in the LMP handler were discovered while actu-
ally trying to reverse engineer and explore features. Code execution
within LMPBPCS parsingwas foundwhen trying to figure out what
this proprietary handler is doing. An LMP_start_encryption_req
was sent accidentally when confusing the maximum valid LMP
length field with the opcode field, which both are 17. Most likely
Bluetooth LLs did not experience proper testing due to lack of
openly available tools—a gap we aim to close with this paper.
6 CONCLUSION
Once reverse engineered, the Broadcom diagnostic protocol offers
a lot of options and is easy to use. In future releases of Bluetooth
stacks this could become a debug feature integrated by default.
Future work will be porting Broadcom diagnostics to further
protocol stacks, such as BlueZ in Linux [12]. Linux integration
should be straightforward, sockets for interception and injection are
provided by default. Diagnostic commands are filtered, hence some
code changes are required. Our reverse engineering results already
confirm Broadcom diagnostics exist in Bluetooth chips of Raspberry
Pi 3/3+, which are even cheaper than Android smartphones.
Bluetooth plays an important role in security critical application
areas such as the IoT. By reverse engineering the Broadcom diag-
nostic protocol and providing an open source analysis framework,
we enable advanced on-device analysis of lower layer Bluetooth
protocols—the remote device under test can be from any vendor.
During the development process, we already discovered critical
vulnerabilities in the implementation of the LL protocols in widely
deployed Bluetooth firmware. It is to be expected that LL parsing
in Bluetooth firmwares of other vendors has similar bugs. We en-
courage researchers to dig deeper into wireless firmware in general,
especially if little is known or documented.
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